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Executive Summary
The Government of India has set ambitious renewable 
energy targets for 2022, in order to achieve its climate 
goals and enhance energy security. Given India’s budget 
constraints, a cost-effective policy path will be crucial in 
achieving these targets.1 
Governments around the world are using 
auctions more to procure renewable 
energy.
One way to reduce the cost of government support 
needed to achieve its renewable energy targets is 
through the tariffs it uses to procure renewable energy. 
Federal and regional governments in India have 
procured renewable energy through two mechanisms: 
feed-in tariffs, where the government fixes tariffs (i.e., 
the rate at which electricity is procured) for projects 
which are allotted on a first-come, first-serve basis, 
and auctions, where project developers quote tariffs to 
the government and are selected based on  predefined 
technical and financial criteria. Typically, wind power 
has been procured through feed-in tariffs, and solar 
power through auctions. 
Auctions for renewable energy are gaining popularity 
around the world due to their potential as a more cost-
effective mechanism for the government. In this context, 
we examined auctions in India and elsewhere to answer 
two questions. First, have auctions been effective, or in 
other words, are they desirable as a project allocation 
mechanism? Second, how can they be designed to 
achieve India’s renewable energy targets, or in other 
words, how can they be made feasible?
1 For instance, funds allocated to Ministry of New and Renewable Energy 
(MNRE), were reduced from INR 1,500 Crores in 2013-14 to INR 441 Crores 
in 2014-15.
We found that auctions are almost always cost-
effective and have led to fair project allocation in 
most cases, but so far have not resulted in adequate 
deployment. We also found that high risk of certain 
factors can hurt the effectiveness of auctions, but 
that the right policy designs can lower risk to make 
auctions more feasible for renewable energy. 
Effectiveness 
We assessed whether auctions are desirable as 
a project selection mechanism by examining 20 
renewable energy auctions around the world with 
respect to cost-effectiveness, deployment effectiveness, 
and the design to encourage market development.
Cost-effectiveness 
We define cost-effectiveness as a reduction in tariffs 
due to auctions when compared with a baseline 
feed-in tariff. Given that government cost of support 
is directly proportional to these tariffs, this reduction 
translates to a reduction in government cost of 
support. In this context, we also examined whether 
auctions are discovering tariffs that are close to the 
rate of renewable electricity that a competitive market 
would discover,2 and whether transaction costs impact 
cost-effectiveness.
Auctions were almost always 
cost-effective.
Auction-discovered tariffs were almost always lower 
than the baseline feed-in tariffs for the auctions we 
studied, meaning they were almost always cost-
effective. We observed savings of up to 58% from the 
baseline feed-in tariff. 47% of the auctions had savings 
of greater than 20%; 24% had savings of 10-20%; and 
29% had savings of up to 10%. 
2 A price from auctions that is too high means that the auction was not as 
cost-effective as it could have been, while a price from auctions that is too 
low increases the risk of non-deployment.
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Second, auction-discovered tariffs for solar projects 
in India have moved closer to market tariffs. Auction-
discovered tariffs moved from within 23-35% of 
competitive tariffs in 2010-2011 to within 1-6% by 
2012-2013.  
Third, when we looked at whether auctions might lead 
to increased costs for project developers, we did not 
find any additional transaction costs when compared 
with feed-in tariffs. However, developers are concerned 
about the indirect financing costs due to uncertainty 
about auction outcomes. 
Deployment effectiveness 
We define deployment effectiveness as the ability of 
auctions to deploy the capacity of renewable energy 
intended through these auctions. 
Among the auctions we studied, although some 
auctions were able to deploy capacity successfully, 
many were not able to deploy the full intended 
amount. Only 17% of the auctions had greater than 
75% deployment of the capacity auctioned, while 8% 
had 50-75% deployment, and 75% had less than 25% 
deployment.   
Deployment effectiveness can be improved 
with better risk management.
Poor risk management is the primary reason for the 
failure of auctions in deployment effectiveness. Changes 
to policy design could improve this. 
Market development
We define market development as whether an auction 
ensured high competition and therefore reduced 
risks to deployment. This would help the long-term 
development of competitive markets, which would then 
result in improved market efficiency, including long-
term cost-effectiveness, over time. 
We found that auctions led to fair allocation of projects 
in the majority of cases, when policy was designed to 
encourage high participation and limit allowed capacity 
per bidder. Among the auctions we examined, around 
2/3rds of the auctions were competitive or moderately 
concentrated, meaning that capacity was allocated 
to a large number of developers. Capacity allocations 
in approximately 1/3rd of the auctions were highly 
concentrated, with a few dominant developers garnering 
the majority of the capacity auctioned.
Feasibility
We examined how to best design auctions to reach 
India’s renewable energy targets by assessing seven 
risks which might affect their success. We found that 
auctions can achieve cost-effectiveness and deployment 
effectiveness with the right policy design.  
Cost-effectiveness is affected most by auction design 
risk, which is risk related to the design of auctions 
such as the volume of capacity to be auctioned and 
type of bidding. In particular, an auction is not cost-
effective when there is not enough competition for the 
capacity auctioned. Controlling the renewable capacity 
auctioned and encouraging participation from project 
developers can result in sufficient competition and thus 
cost-effectiveness.  
Deployment effectiveness is most affected by auction 
design risk, completion risk, which is the risk of all 
factors that could delay the commissioning of projects, 
and financial risk, which is the risk of projects not 
being able to raise finance due to low bid prices or 
high off-taker risk. We found that auction design risk 
to deployment effectiveness in terms of underbidding 
can be best managed by imposing strong penalties for 
not commissioning the projects. Addressing problems 
associated with delays in transmission interconnection 
through support policies for transmission infrastructure 
expansion, and problems associated with poor financial 
health of the off-taker through a payment security 
mechanism, can minimize completion and financial 
risks.3 
We also found that it is important to consider both 
cost-effectiveness and deployment effectiveness 
together. Designing auctions with the sole objective of 
cost-effectiveness, as in the case of auctions in which 
all bidders were asked to match the lowest bid, could 
negatively affect deployment. Auctions that were 
balanced in their objectives and managed risks well 
have demonstrated that both cost and deployment 
effectiveness can be achieved together. 
3 To see individual auctions and how they managed risks, refer to Table 3 in 
Section 3.
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Auctions for wind power 
Given significant developer resistance to wind energy 
auctions in India, we gave special attention to how wind 
auctions could be designed to meet India’s wind energy 
goals.
In the cases we examined, although wind power 
auctions have been cost-effective, they did not meet 
deployment targets due to poor risk management, 
primarily underbidding risk and completion risk. We 
suggest mitigating underbidding risk through penalties 
for not commissioning on time, and completion risk 
through preemptive measures such as providing 
regulatory permits prior to holding site-specific 
auctions.  
Policy Implications
Our analysis indicates that, if designed appropriately 
to manage risks, auctions can deploy renewable 
energy capacity in a cost-effective and fair manner. 
The following policy design features would likely make 
auctions more successful: 
 • To increase cost-effectiveness, ensure sufficient 
competition by setting the volume of capacity 
auctioned well within the market’s ability to 
supply. 
 • To improve deployment effectiveness, impose 
strong penalties for delays in commissioning 
projects, implement support policies to improve 
transmission infrastructure, and provide 
government guarantees to reduce off-taker risk.
 • Use auction design elements that can mitigate 
risks to achieve both cost-effectiveness and 
deployment effectiveness together. For the 
specific case of wind energy in India, introduce 
auctions in a controlled environment, in 
which the project site is already identified, 
transmission infrastructure is planned, and 
resource assessment studies are completed 
prior to bidding.
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1. Auctions for Renewable Energy
Governments around the world are increasing their 
use of auctions a means to procure renewable 
energy, due to their potential as a more cost-effective 
mechanism. Under auctions, a renewable energy buyer 
(governments or utilities) announces interest in buying 
a set amount of electricity from renewable energy 
sources. Renewable energy sellers (project developers) 
who meet predefined technical and financial criteria 
then submit price bids to the renewable energy buyer, 
who typically selects the sellers based on the lowest 
bids. 
In India, governments have been using both auctions 
and feed-in tariffs to procure renewable energy, typically 
auctions for solar power and feed-in tariffs for wind 
power. Under feed-in tariffs, governments offer long-
term contracts and guaranteed payment for electricity 
at a fixed rate. Although feed-in tariffs are a popular 
mechanism, governments may not always have the best 
information to set the correct, competitive tariff, which 
can lead to cost inefficiency if too high, or underbidding 
and non-deployment if too low.
Given India’s budget constraints for supporting 
renewable energy, a cost-effective policy path is crucial 
to achieving the country’s renewable energy targets. 
Auctions, if designed properly, could help deploy 
renewable energy capacity in a cost-effective and 
transparent manner.4
4 We discuss different types of auctions in Appendix A
However, policymakers in India have raised questions 
about the ability of auctions to achieve the expected 
goals and whether auction risks can be properly 
managed. To assist policymakers in India, we assessed 
the following two questions: 
 • Have auctions been effective as a mechanism to 
procure renewable energy, or in other words, are 
they desirable?
 • How can auctions be designed to achieve India’s 
renewable energy targets, or in other words, 
how can they be made feasible?
We selected a sample of 20 renewable energy auctions 
to study in detail. Our criteria for selection were 
auctions in similar large developing countries as India, 
auctions that provide sample variation (for example, 
auctions in developed countries which were perceived 
to fail or succeed), and auctions with the necessary 
available data.5
Section 2 examines if auctions have been effective as 
a mechanism to procure renewable energy. Section 3 
examines the risks which might affect auctions and how 
auctions can be designed better to manage risks, with 
a special focus on auctions for wind power. Section 4 
offers recommendations to policymakers. 
5 We applied these criteria on a larger group of 25 auctions to select the 
most suitable auction programs to study in detail. We listed these auctions 
in Table 4 in Appendix B.
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2. Effectiveness
To assess whether auctions have been effective as a 
mechanism to procure renewable energy, we examined 
20 auctions and measured their success against three 
objectives:6
 • Cost-effectiveness
 • Deployment effectiveness
 • Market development
We consider cost and deployment effectiveness to be 
primary policy objectives of auctions. However, market 
development is also important, given that it carries both 
short-term and long-term  implications for deployment 
and cost-effectiveness.
2.1 Cost Effectiveness
To determine cost-effectiveness, we looked at the 
weighted average tariff of the winning bids in an auction 
and compared it with a baseline feed-in tariff. We 
defined cost-effectiveness as a reduction in the auction 
tariff when compared with the baseline feed-in tariff. 
Our baseline feed-in tariff is the feed-in tariff that was 
previously used in the same region of the auction or 
used in a comparable region around the same time. 7 
For example, to measure the tariff reduction achieved 
through India’s National Solar Mission Phase 1 Batch 1 
auction (2010), we used the feed-in tariff from Gujarat’s 
Solar PV project (2009), which existed prior to the 
introduction of the National Solar Mission, as the 
baseline feed-in tariff.8
6 We developed these objectives from discussions with policymakers and 
other experts, Maurer L. et al., (2011), and MNRE (2012). This research 
indicated that these are the three main policy objectives for using auctions 
to procure renewable energy. 
7 The ideal baseline is the feed-in tariff that would have been used if the 
auction were not introduced. Since these do not exist, instead we used 
a proxy – the feed-in tariff that existed in that country/region or the 
feed-in tariff that existed in a comparable region around the same time. 
These tariffs would have continued or adopted in case auctions were not 
introduced. We acknowledge that this metric is not perfect, especially in 
the case of solar PV, where tariffs have decreased drastically over the last 
five years. Our cost-effectiveness results could be somewhat overstating 
the benefit of auctions. 
8 For subsequent state level auctions, we used Central Electricity Regulatory 
Commission’s (CERC) benchmark tariff applicable for that year, as states 
would have most likely adopted it as their feed-in tariff had auctions not 
been introduced. 
Auctions were almost always cost-effective.
Auction-discovered tariffs were almost always lower 
than the baseline feed-in tariffs for the 17 auctions we 
studied.9 Tariff reductions were up to 58% in the case 
of solar PV auctions and up to 30% in the case of wind 
auctions (Figure 1).
Tariff reductions were greater in solar auctions than 
in wind auctions because solar power has been 
experiencing significant reductions in capital costs. 
However, wind power auctions are still an attractive 
mechanism to achieve cost-effectiveness. 
To categorize the success of auctions in cost-
effectiveness, we created the following thresholds:10
 • Highly successful: A tariff reduction of more than 
20%
 • Successful: A tariff reduction of 10-20%
 • Somewhat successful: A tariff reduction of 0-10%
Based on the above scale, 60% of the solar auctions 
were highly successful, 30% were successful, and 10% 
were somewhat successful. Among the wind auctions, 
29% of the auctions were highly successful, 14% were 
successful, and 57% were somewhat successful.
We also examined whether auctions are discovering 
competitive tariffs, or in other words, tariffs that are 
closer to prices of renewable energy in a competitive 
market. 
Ideally auction-discovered tariffs should be similar to 
tariffs that would be discovered in a competitive market. 
Tariffs that are too high are not as cost-effective as 
they could be; too low and they raise the risk that the 
winning bidders do not deploy.
We compared the tariffs from Indian solar power 
auctions to an estimate of a competitive tariff, which 
would also indicate if auction-discovered tariffs were 
tracking reductions in renewable energy costs.11 
9 Out of the 20 auctions we selected for this work, 3 did not have available 
data for the baseline feed-in tariff, so we examined 17 auctions.
10 This categorization allowed us to assess the relative performance of auc-
tions with respect to cost and deployment effectiveness and for measur-
ing risks. The categories were created by dividing the range available. We 
have more categories when the range is large and vice versa. This scale is 
similar to well-known scales such as the Likert scale (Likert R., 1932). 
11 We explain how we estimated the competitive tariff in Appendix C. Our 
analysis is limited to Indian auctions due to data availability.
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In Indian solar power auctions, we found that, while 
auction-discovered tariffs are lower than competitive 
tariffs, they have moved closer to the competitive tariffs 
over the past four years. Auction-discovered tariffs 
moved from within 23-35% of the competitive tariffs in 
2010 to 2011, to within 1-6% in 2012 to 2013 (Figure 2). It 
appears auctions are dynamically tracking reductions in 
costs of solar power (which is reflected in competitive 
tariffs), at least in the case of solar auctions in India.
Although auction-discovered tariffs have moved 
closer to competitive tariffs, they are still somewhat 
lower, possibly either because of underbidding by 
inexperienced players due to a lack of understanding 
of the true costs (Deshmukh R. et al., 2011)12 or because 
CERC improved its estimates of benchmark tariffs over 
time with more experience, upon which our estimated 
competitive tariffs largely relied.
12 Some reports indicate that internal rate of return (IRR) for the projects 
commissioned under JNNSM Phase 1 Batch 1&2 could be as low as 10% 
and 12% respectively (Donovan C., 2011).
There are no additional evident transaction costs 
under auctions, but developers are concerned about 
the costs and risks of business uncertainty. 
We also examined whether auctions led to an increase 
in transaction costs for renewable energy project 
developers, which would in turn decrease the cost-
effectiveness of auctions by increasing the bid prices. In 
our research and discussions with project developers, 
we did not systematically find additional tangible 
transaction costs for auctions when compared with 
feed-in tariffs. 
In fact, in some situations, auctions may actually be less 
costly than feed-in tariffs, especially for developers who 
commission projects on time. For example, in the state 
of Karnataka, commissioning a solar PV plant under 
Karnataka’s auctions is cheaper than under the feed-in 
tariff policy, with a non-refundable fee of INR 10,000 
under auctions compared to a non-refundable fee of INR 
1.10 lakh per MW under the feed-in tariff policy (KREDL, 
2011 & 2014). 
Figure 1: Cost-effectiveness of auctions
U.K. NFFO RE Auction 1994
U.K. NFFO RE Auction 1997
S. Africa Wind Auction 2011
Brazil Wind Auction 2009
Brazil Wind Auction 2010
S. Africa Wind Auction 2012
U.K. NFFO RE Auction 1998
India JNNSM Solar PV 2010*
Uttar Pradesh Solar PV 2013
Andhra Pradesh Solar PV 2013
Tamil Nadu Solar PV 2012
Karnataka Solar PV 2013
Madhya Pradesh Solar PV 2014
S. Africa Solar PV 2011
India JNNSM Solar PV 2011
S. Africa Solar PV 2012
0 10 20 30 40 50 60%
tari
reduction
 from FiT
Cost-eectiveness of Auctions (% tari reduction from FiT)
WIND
SOLAR
SOMEWHAT 
SUCCESSFUL
SUCCESSFUL HIGHLY 
SUCCESSFUL
Karnataka Solar PV 2011
* Using the Gujarat feed-in tariff as the baseline, the tariff reduction achieved is 3.3%. Using CERC’s benchmark tariff as the baseline, the tariff reduction is 32.3%.
Sources: World Bank, GERC, MNRE, Panchabuta, Economic Times, KREDL, Re-Solve, EfficientCarbon, IFC, IRENA, ANEEL, GWEC
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On the other hand, in the same state, penalties for not 
commissioning a project on time, which are typically 
collected up front as security deposits and are refunded 
when the projects are commissioned on time, are much 
higher under auctions. These penalties, in the form 
of various refundable fees, are INR 21.10 lakh per MW 
under auctions compared with INR 5 lakh per MW 
under feed-in tariffs. 
Despite a lack of evidence of additional transaction 
costs under auctions, it is important to note that 
project developers are concerned about the intangible 
cost of business uncertainty under auctions.13 Project 
developers have to incur costs and raise money, but 
face the uncertainty of not winning a project under 
auctions. Developers are also subjected to the stop-
and-go approach of auctions as they have to wait for 
the government/procurer to hold auctions at timely 
intervals.
Some studies indicate that because of these intangible 
costs, financing costs of projects under auctions could 
increase compared with projects under feed-in tariffs, 
due to uncertainty and higher perceived risks for 
investors (Bloomberg, 2011).  
13 Based on our discussions with project developers
2.2 Deployment Effectiveness
Under auctions, the government announces 
interest in buying a set amount of renewable 
energy capacity, which is then auctioned to 
project developers. We define deployment 
effectiveness as the ability of the winning project 
developer to deploy the planned capacity under 
the auction.14 
To measure deployment effectiveness, we 
examined the percentage of capacity deployed 
from the total capacity auctioned, for 12 
auctions.15 
To categorize the success of auctions in 
deployment effectiveness, we created the 
following thresholds: 
 • High deployment: Deployment of more than 
75% of planned capacity
 • Medium deployment: Deployment of more 
than 50-75% of planned capacity
 •   Low deployment: Deployment of less than 50% 
of planned capacity
Deployment effectiveness was negatively affected by 
poor risk management.
For the auctions we studied, although some auctions 
were able to deploy capacity successfully, many were 
not able to deploy the full intended amount, due to poor 
risk management.   
Only 17% of the auctions had high deployment with 
greater than 75% deployment, while 8% had medium 
deployment with 50-75% deployment, and 75% had low 
deployment with less than 50% deployment (Figure 3).16 
14 We measured deployment achieved by the date of our research, Sept-Oct 
2014. The ideal metric is deployment achieved by the commissioning 
deadline specific to each of the auctions, but there were a number of 
instances of extension of deadlines and lack of data of commissioned 
capacity by deadlines. We excluded those auctions that haven’t reached 
their commis sioning deadlines (e.g., South Africa) assessment.   
15 We looked at 12 of the 20 auctions we initially selected because 8 of the 
auctions have yet to reach their commission deadlines or have just passed 
their deadlines but don’t have available data yet. 
16 This does not include - Karnataka Solar PV Phase 2 (Aug 2013), Madhya 
Pradesh Solar PV (Jan 2014), Brazil’s Wind Phase 2, California’s RAM 1&2, 
and South Africa’s Phase 1&2 Wind and Solar auctions –as they are too 
recent and are yet to reach the deadline for commissioning. 
Figure 2: Auction tariffs vs. competitive tariffs
6 11 16 
INR/kWh
COMPETITIVE
PRICE
AVERAGE PRICE 
OF WINNING BIDS
Madhya Pradesh 
Solar PV 2014
Karnataka 
Solar PV 2013
Uttar Pradesh 
Solar PV 2013
Andhra Pradesh 
Solar PV 2013
Tamil Nadu 
Solar PV 2012
India JNNSM 
Solar PV 2011
Karnataka 
Solar PV 2011
India JNNSM 
Solar PV 2010
Source: NVVN, KREDL, UPNEDA, CERC, Efficientcarbon, Re-solve
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Deployment effectiveness was primarily impeded by 
poor risk management. It is important to note, however, 
that project risks, which are risks that can affect all 
procurement mechanisms, affected deployment more 
than risks specific only to auctions (discussed more in 
Section 3). This indicates that auctions specifically were 
not entirely responsible for poor deployment.
This is evident in India as well, where other procurement 
mechanisms such as feed-in tariffs have experienced 
poor deployment. For example, Rajasthan’s wind 
power feed-in tariff policy of 2004, which allotted a 
total of 12,435 MW of projects in 2004-2012, resulted 
in deployment of only 1,790 MW, or 14% of the total 
capacity that was allotted (RRECL, 2014). Karnataka 
also recorded poor deployment effectiveness of 20% 
under their feed-in tariff policy (KREDL, 2015).   
On the other hand, auctions that managed risks well, 
such as India’s JNNSM auctions, were successful in 
deployment. We discuss this further in Section 3.
2.3 Market Development
Under auctions, governments allocate renewable 
energy capacity based on the price quoted by project 
developers, and usually the lowest bidders win. A 
single large dominant player could place the lowest 
bid for a project that garners the majority of the 
capacity auctioned, if no restrictions are in place. This 
concentration would increase the risk of projects not 
being commissioned due to developer specific risks, 
such as bankruptcy. 
High competition among bidders and a competitive 
allocation of planned capacity not only reduce risks to 
deployment in the short-term, but also help develop a 
longer-term sustainable market, which requires more 
than a few large developers in the market. A long-
term competitive market results in improved market 
efficiency, including long-term cost-effectiveness, over 
time. To measure the fairness and competitiveness of 
auctions, we used the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI).17 We also checked for auction designs such as a 
cap on capacity per bidder.  
17 The HHI index is calculated with the following formula: HHI = 
S1^2+S2^2+S3^2+……+Sn^2 where S1 is the market share of bidder 1, S2 
is the market share of bidder 2 and so on. The resulting HHI number will 
range from close to zero to 10,000, which indicates low to high market 
concentration. We used the classification of the U.S. Department of Justice 
(U.S. Dept. of Justice, 1992) in evaluating the market place with the HHI 
index.
Figure 3: Deployment effectiveness of auctions
India JNNSM Solar PV 2010
India JNNSM Solar PV 2011
Karnataka Solar PV 2011
Tamil Nadu Solar PV 2012
Andhra Pradesh Solar PV 2013
Uttar Pradesh Solar PV 2013
U.K. NFFO RE Auction 1990
U.K. NFFO RE Auction 1994
U.K. NFFO RE Auction 1991
U.K. NFFO RE Auction 1997
U.K. NFFO RE Auction 1998
Brazil Wind Auction 2009
0 20 40 60 80 100%
deployment
WIND
SOLAR
Deployment Eectiveness of Auctions (level of deployment acheived)
LOW
DEPLOYMENT
MEDIUM
DEPLOYMENT
HIGH
DEPLOYMENT
Source: MNRE, KREDL, Re-Solve, NEDA, Efficientcarbon, Aneel, Windpowermonthly
Note: All data is as of September 2014, except for the Brazil auctions which is as of August 2012, which is close to the original deadline for commissioning.
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Auctions led to fair allocation of projects in the 
majority of cases.
We found that auctions led to fair allocation of projects 
in the majority of cases, when policy was designed to 
encourage high participation and limit allowed capacity 
per bidder. Among the 12 auctions we examined, around 
2/3rds of the auctions were competitive or moderately 
concentrated, meaning that capacity was allocated to a 
large number of developers. Approximately 1/3rd of the 
auctions were highly concentrated, with a few dominant 
developers garnering the majority of the capacity 
auctioned (Table 1).  
Auctions designed to allocate capacity to multiple 
players, such as through a limit on capacity per bidder, 
would likely improve cost-effectiveness by encouraging 
competition, as well as increase deployment 
effectiveness by diversifying developer-specific risks, 
such as bankruptcy of the developer, which can lead to 
delayed or abandoned projects
Some of the auctions we examined included a limit on 
capacity per project instead of a limit per bidder and 
some both.18 A cap on capacity per project would ensure 
that high volume of capacity is not concentrated at 
any one geographic location, which could burden the 
transmission network.  
18 Auctions that included limit on capacity per bidder were successful in 
allocating capacity in a competitive manner, for example, the Indian Solar 
PV auctions of National Solar Mission and Karnataka. Auctions such as 
Madhya Pradesh and South African solar and wind auctions, which did not 
include a limit on capacity per bidder, resulted in concentrated capacity 
allocations.   
Table 1: Capacity allocation in auctions
AUCTION
TOTAL 
CAPACITY 
AUCTIONED 
(MW)
HHI SCORE REMARKS
LIMIT PER 
BIDDER 
(MW)
LIMIT PER 
PROJECT 
(MW)
JNNSM 
BATCH 1 PHASE 1 SOLAR PV (DEC 2010)
150 333 Competitive 5 5
KARNATAKA 
SOLAR PV PHASE 1 (OCT 2011)
50 1,411 Moderately concentrated 10 10
JNNSM 
BATCH 2 PHASE 1 SOLAR PV (DEC 2011)
350 661 Competitive 50 20
TAMIL NADU 
PHASE 1 SOLAR PV (DEC 2012)
1,000 271 Competitive No limit No limit
UTTAR PRADESH 
SOLAR PV (MAR 2013)
200 2,189 Highly concentrated 50 50
KARNATAKA 
SOLAR PV PHASE 2 (AUG 2013)
130 828 Competitive 10 10
MADHYA PRADESH 
SOLAR PV (JAN 2014)
100 2,050 Highly concentrated No limit No limit
BRAZIL
 WIND AUCTIONS PHASE 1 (DEC 2009)
13,341 2,802 Highly concentrated No info No info
S. AFRICA 
WIND AUCTION PHASE 1 (2011)
1,850 1,682 Moderately concentrated No limit 140
S. AFRICA 
WIND AUCTION PHASE 2 (2012)
650 1,871 Highly concentrated No limit 140
S. AFRICA
 SOLAR PV AUCTION PHASE 1 (2011)
1,450 1,230 Moderately concentrated No limit 75
S. AFRICA 
SOLAR PV AUCTION PHASE 2 (2012)
450 1,543 Moderately concentrated No limit 75
Source: MNRE, KREDL, Re-Solve, NEDA, Efficientcarbon, ANEEL, Eskom, Windpowermonthly
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3. Feasibility 
The second question we examined was: how can 
auctions be designed to achieve India’s renewable 
energy targets, or in other words, how can they be made 
feasible?
We analyzed whether auctions can be a feasible 
mechanism for reaching India’s renewable energy 
targets by identifying risks which might affect their 
success. We identified several risk factors which can 
affect all renewable energy projects, as well as risk 
factors which are specific to auctions, and combined 
them into seven individual risks (Table 2).19 We also 
categorized them as auction-specific risks or project 
risks to assess which category of risks affects auctions 
the most. 
We assessed the impact of these risks by rating the 
intensity of each one and examining the effect of each 
risk on cost and deployment effectiveness.20 We provide 
detailed definitions of these risks and how we measured 
the intensity of each of these risks in  Appendix D.
3.1 Total Risk
Total risk, which is the combination of all seven 
individual risks, has a negative impact on both cost and 
deployment effectiveness, as expected. 21  
Although we found that an increase in total risk results 
in lower cost-effectiveness, we would need more data 
for statistically significant results. 
19 We categorized into seven individual risks to enable statistical analysis, 
which requires the number of dependent variables - i.e., the number of 
auctions in our study - to be considerably higher than the number of 
independent variables - i.e., risks.
20 We rated each of the seven identified risks on a scale of one to three, with 
one representing a low intensity risk, two medium, and three representing 
the highest intensity for each of the auctions we examined. We arrived at 
these ratings from discussions with project developers and researchers 
and through literature review. We then examined the effect of these risks 
on cost and deployment effectiveness via correlation matrix (Goodman 
and Kruskal Gamma) and regression analysis. We followed a three-step 
statistical approach for this analysis; first, we measured the impact of total 
risk, second, we measured the impact of risk categories - auction-specific 
and project; and third, we measured the impact of each individual risk. 
We combined this statistical analysis with in-depth qualitative analysis to 
arrive at our findings.
21 Total risk is the sum of quantitative values assigned to individual risks 
based on intensity.
Our findings were more conclusive for deployment 
effectiveness. We found that for every 1% increase in 
total risk, deployment effectiveness decreased by nearly 
2 percentage points.22 This underscores the need for 
increased focus on risk reduction to ensure deployment. 
3.2 Project risks vs. auction specific risks
Project risks had a higher impact on deployment 
effectiveness than auction-specific risks.
Between the risks which affect all renewable energy 
projects (project risks) and risks which affect only 
auctions (auction-specific risks), we found that project 
risks had a greater effect (see Table 2).
We found that project risks did not significantly impact 
cost-effectiveness. On the other hand, we found that 
project risks have approximately 60% greater negative 
impact than auction-specific risks on deployment 
effectiveness. This indicates that policymakers should 
focus more on project risks to ensure deployment. 
3.3 Individual risks
Cost-effectiveness is most affected by auction design 
risk. 
Among all the risks that affected the cost-effectiveness 
of auctions, we found that auction design, and 
specifically when the design did not encourage enough 
competition for the capacity auctioned, was the only 
risk that had a statistically significant impact.23 For 
example, in South Africa’s solar power auctions, where 
the auction design risk was high, the tariff reduction was 
only 30%. In comparison, an auction with low auction 
design risk recorded a tariff reduction of 58%. 
22 A percentage point refers to absolute change from the reference value. For 
example, a reduction in deployment effectiveness from 20% to 18% is a 2 
percentage point decrease and a 10% decrease.
23 Another factor that likely played a role in cost-effectiveness is market 
timing. An example of market timing driving tariff reductions would be the 
Indian national solar auctions, which were introduced at a time (2010-11) 
when solar module prices in the global market were declining due to slow-
down in demand in key economies (World Bank, 2013). Several state solar 
auctions quickly followed the national auctions to benefit from the slump 
in global module prices and the experience gained in the national auctions. 
However, we would not consider market timing as an auction design 
element as timing of auctions would be an extremely difficult exercise for 
policymakers.  
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We found that this risk can be reduced if policymakers 
ensure more competition by auctioning a volume of 
capacity which is well within the market’s ability to 
supply. For example, in auctions in South Africa, this 
strategy resulted in an additional 28 percentage point 
reduction in auction-discovered tariffs compared to the 
baseline feed-in tariff. In Phase 1 of South Africa’s Wind 
and Solar Auctions, there was no cap on the volume 
of capacity auctioned, which led to less competition 
and a tariff reduction of 30%. In Phase 2, the volume 
of capacity auctioned was limited, which led to more 
competition and a greater tariff reduction of 58% 
(Eberhard A., et al. 2014).  
Deployment effectiveness is most affected by auction 
design risk, completion risk, and financial risk. 
Auction design, specifically with respect to flawed tariff 
determination, has impacted deployment effectiveness. 
For example, in the Indian Solar PV auctions of Tamil 
Nadu Phase 1 (Dec 2012) and Andhra Pradesh (Feb 
2013) , under the auction design, selected 
bidders were asked to match the lowest 
bid in order to sign a contract (Economic 
Times, 2012 and Re-Solve, 2013). This 
forced bidders with different cost 
structures to accept the lowest bid and 
commission the projects at a loss, which 
led to poor deployment. 
On the other hand, Karnataka, a 
neighboring state of Tamil Nadu and 
Andhra Pradesh, used a pay-as-bid type 
of tariff determination, which resulted in 
much higher capacity deployment (Figure 
3). Pay-as-bid tariffs allow developers to 
commission projects at tariffs that they 
determine, if they win a project.  
Second, completion risk, such as 
delays in obtaining environmental and 
other regulatory permits and lack of 
transmissions interconnection, has also 
affected deployment effectiveness. 
Delays in obtaining regulatory permits 
negatively affected deployment in the U.K. 
NFFO auctions (Mitchell C., et al. 2004). 
Likewise, delays in issuing environmental 
permits and lack of transmission 
interconnection (both completion risks) 
affected capacity deployment in Brazil 
wind auctions (Cunha G., et al., 2012). 
Completion risks such as delays in 
regulatory permits and transmission 
interconnection can be managed through both auction 
design elements and support policies. Specifically, in 
the case of renewables, which are location-constrained, 
transmission planning should be conducted before the 
auction or coincide with it (Madrigal M. et al., 2011).   
A third risk that affected deployment effectiveness is 
financial risk, which is the risk of projects not being able 
to raise finance or attain financial closure. Financial risk 
impacted capacity deployment in the U.K. NFFO wind 
auctions, and Tamil Nadu Phase 1 (Dec 2012), Andhra 
Pradesh (Feb 2013), and Uttar Pradesh (Mar 2013) solar 
PV auctions. Financial risk for the U.K. NFFO projects 
was high because developers placed bids lower than 
actual costs to win projects (C. Mitchell, 2004). In the 
case of the Tamil Nadu and Uttar Pradesh auctions, 
high off-taker risk coupled with a lack of any payment 
guarantee mechanism increased their financial risk 
(Business Line, 2013). 
Table 2: Risks for renewable energy projects under auctions
RISK FACTOR RISKS RISK CATEGORY
Flawed tariff determination 
(L1 process*) Auction design 
(Risks related 
to the design of 
auctions)
Auction-specific 
(Risks that arise 
out of the auction 
process)
Lack of competition
Favoring a specific technology 
(technology neutral auctions**)
Contract re-negotiations
Aggressive and unrealistic bids 
by developers to win projects Underbidding
Lack of tariff reduction due to 
cartelization of bidders Collusion
Delay in land acquisition Completion 
(Includes all factors 
that could delay the 
commissioning of 
the projects)
Project (Risks that 
are generally faced 
by all renewable 
energy projects and 
are common with 
other procurement 
mechanisms, such as 
feed-in tariffs)
Delay in environmental and other 
regulatory permits
Delay in transmission 
interconnection
Projects not able to achieve 
financial closure Financial
Payment default by procurer Off-taker risk
Lack of accurate resource data 
(Resource risk) Technology
Plant underperformance
*L1 process: In this context, a process where the auctioneer asks all the selected bidders to 
commission projects at the lowest tariff discovered.
** In technology neutral auctions, a procurer does not specify capacity targets for each technolo-
gy, but allows competition among different energy technologies. This design benefits matured 
and cheaper technologies.
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A payment guarantee mechanism 
could help mitigate financial risk, 
especially if the procurer is not 
financially healthy. One of the 
drivers of high deployment in India’s 
JNNSM solar power auctions was 
the presence of a payment guarantee 
mechanism, which made power 
purchase contracts under this auction 
more bankable (World Bank, 2013). 
Underbidding risk, the risk of low, 
unrealistic bids by bidders just to win 
a project, can also affect deployment 
effectiveness. In the case of the U.K. 
NFFO auctions, the lack of penalties 
for delays in commissioning projects 
encouraged risky and unrealistic bids 
in order to win projects (Mitchell C., 
et al. 2004). The U.K. NFFO auctions 
were some of the first auctions to 
be held for renewable energy and 
lacked design elements to counter 
underbidding risk. 
Learning from the failure of the U.K. 
NFFO auctions, all the subsequent 
auctions we studied used penalties 
to counter underbidding risk. Auctions such as JNNSM 
Phase 1 were successful in deploying capacity partly 
due to inclusion of strong penalties for delaying or 
not commissioning the projects. This suggests that 
policymakers should continue to use penalties for failure 
to commission projects on time to ensure deployment 
effectiveness.  
3.4 Achieving both cost and deployment 
effectiveness
Policymakers have concerns about whether high 
tariff reductions achieved in auctions could lead to 
deployment failure, due to underbidding and, therefore, 
low returns to investors that ultimately make the 
projects financially unviable. This was evident in the 
U.K. NFFO auctions, in which many developers underbid 
and eventually failed to commission their projects.  
We examined ten auctions, for which we have both 
cost and deployment data, to determine whether there 
is tension between cost and deployment effectiveness. 
As shown earlier, while almost all the auctions were 
cost-effective, only a few were effective in both cost and 
deployment (Figure 4). 
However, high cost-effectiveness need not be always 
a result of underbidding. Our analysis indicates that 
deployment failure in many of the auctions was 
independent of the tariff reductions.24 
As stated earlier, flawed auction design with respect 
to tariff determination method, lack of penalties, and 
payment security mechanisms (when off-taker risk was 
high), as well as lack of support policies for transmission 
infrastructure development led to poor deployment. 
With proper risk management, both cost and 
deployment effectiveness can be achieved together.
Auctions that are designed well with respect to 
managing risks have achieved success in both cost 
and deployment effectiveness; for example, JNNSM 
Solar Phase 1 Batch 1 and 2 and Karnataka Solar Phase 
1. In Table 3, we highlight how various risk factors were 
managed through specific design elements in some of 
the auctions. 
24 We did not find a statistically significant and negative relationship 
between cost and deployment effectiveness.
Figure 4: Cost-effectiveness vs. deployment
LEVEL OF
DEPLOYMENT 
COST EFFECTIVENESS HIGHLOW
HIGH
LOW
Uttar Pradesh 
Solar PV 2013
Andhra Pradesh 
Solar PV 2013
Tamil Nadu 
Solar PV 2012
India JNNSM 
Solar PV 2011
Karnataka 
Solar PV 2011
India JNNSM 
Solar PV 2010
U.K.
NFFO RE 
Auction 1994
U.K.
NFFO RE 
Auction 1997 U.K.
NFFO RE 
Auction 1998
Brazil
Wind 
Auction
2009
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Table 3: Design elements to manage risks in renewable energy auctions
INDIVIDUAL 
RISKS RISK FACTORS
LIKELY IMPACT ON 
AUCTION EFFECTIVENESS
DESIGN ELEMENTS TO 
MANAGE THE RISKS
EXAMPLES OF AUCTIONS WHICH 
USED THESE ELEMENTS
Auction design
Flawed tariff deter-
mination (e.g., L1 
process*)
Impacts deployment effective-
ness as L1 process will force 
developers other than the lowest 
bidder to commission projects 
at a loss
Pay-as-bid instead 
of L1 process of tariff 
determination
All the auctions except Tamil Nadu Phase 
1 Solar PV and Andhra Pradesh Solar PV
Lack of competition Impacts cost-effectiveness of auctions Limit on capacity auctioned
All auctions except South Africa Wind 
and Solar Phase 1
Favoring a specific 
technology (technology 
neutral auctions)
Impacts the deployment of 
new technologies as matured 
technology would be more 
competitive
Technology-specific auctions All auctions except Brazil Wind Phase 1&2 and California RAM 1&2
Contract 
re-negotiations
Impacts cost and deployment 
effectiveness as developers seek 
higher tariff and negotiate for 
new power purchase contracts
Non-negotiable power 
purchase contracts
In-built flexibility in PPAs 
allowing surplus and shortfall 
in production to be set-off in 
4-year block periods
South Africa Wind and Solar Phase 1&2
Brazil Wind auctions Phase 1&2
Underbidding
Aggressive and unreal-
istic bids by non-seri-
ous bidders
Impacts deployment effective-
ness due to financial unviability
Penalties for failure to com-
mission projects 
All the auctions except U.K. NFFO 
auctions
Collusion Lack of tariff reduction
Impacts cost-effectiveness as 
bidders collude to keep tariffs 
higher
Ensure high competition and 
adopt sealed-bid auction
Most of the auctions used sealed-bid 
auctions except Brazil Wind Phase 1&2, 
which used descending clock auction.
Completion risk
Delay in environmental 
and other regulatory 
permits
Impacts deployment 
effectiveness 
1) Pre-bid environmental 
license requirement,  
2) Procurer/Govt. handles 
these risks
1) Brazil Wind Phase 1&2 and South 
Africa Wind and Solar Phase 1&2, 
2) India’s coal Ultra Mega Power Plant 
auctions
Delay in transmission 
interconnection
Impacts deployment 
effectiveness Pre-bid grid access studies
India JNNSM Phase 1, Brazil Wind Phase 
1&2, South Africa Wind and Solar Phase 
1&2
Technology risk
1) Lack of accurate 
resource data
2) Resource variability
1) Impacts production of already 
commissioned plant as develop-
ers lack prior knowledge of the 
resource, 
2) Impacts revenues if quantity 
of resource falls short of the 
expected quantity stated in the 
contract
1) Certified pre-bid ground 
resource studies, 
2) Weather derivatives/ 
insurance
1) Brazil Wind Phase 1&2, South Africa 
Wind and Solar Phase 1&2, 2) None of 
the auctions we examined had these as 
part of the auction design, but individual 
developers may have utilized these 
instruments.
Financial risk
Projects not able 
to achieve financial 
closure
Impacts deployment effective-
ness due to financial unviability 
of projects
1) Pre-bid financial criteria, 
2) Concessional finance, and 
3) Financial underwriting of 
bids
1) Almost all auctions, 
2) Brazil Wind Phase 1&2, and 
3) South Africa Wind and Solar Phase 
1&2
Off-taker/coun-
terparty risk
Payment default by 
procurer
Impacts the financial viability of 
a commissioned project
1) A sovereign guarantee 
providing payment security 
in case off-taker payment 
default; 
2) Centralized procurement 
through a financially strong 
off-taker and re-sale to 
regional utilities
1) India JNNSM Phase 1 Batch 1 PV, South 
Africa Wind and Solar Phase 1&2; 2)India 
JNNSM Phase 1, Brazil Wind Phase 1&2, 
South Africa Wind and Solar Phase 1&2 
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Auctions that have been successful in both cost and 
deployment effectiveness used design elements 
such as penalties for failure to commission projects 
to manage underbidding risk. These auctions also 
ensured the presence of high competition to drive cost-
effectiveness. In addition, other project risks such as off-
taker risk were addressed through a payment guarantee 
mechanism to ensure deployment. Managing both 
auction-specific and project risks effectively ensured 
that these auctions achieved both cost and deployment 
effectiveness together. 
It is also important to note that despite the use of 
certain design elements, some auctions have failed 
to achieve cost and deployment effectiveness due to 
the inadequacy of those design elements. In the case 
of Brazil wind energy auctions, although the auctions 
included design elements to handle completion risks 
(Table 3), they were only designed to partially manage 
these risks. For instance, environmental permits in Brazil 
are obtained through a complex three-phase process, 
which can cause delays, and the auction design only 
required the first-phase permit as a prerequisite to bid 
(G. Cunha, et al., 2012).
Therefore, auctions should not only include risk 
mitigating design elements, but also ensure that those 
design elements are effective. Further research is 
required to determine to improve the effectiveness of 
risk mitigating design elements.
3.5 Designing effective wind power 
auctions
Wind developers in India fear higher completion and 
technology risks under auctions.
Given significant developer resistance to wind energy 
auctions in India, we gave special attention to assessing 
the feasibility of wind auctions. From our discussions 
with wind project developers in India, we learned that 
they were concerned that completion and technology 
risks, which are generally higher for wind power 
compared with solar power, would increase further 
under auctions. 
Our research indicates that these concerns are valid 
to a certain extent. Completion risk, specifically 
delays in land acquisition and lack of transmission 
interconnection, could affect commissioning projects on 
time. Land acquisition is a problem in India due to small 
landholdings and lack of land purchase options (Market 
Line, 2014). This means dealing with multiple small 
landowners and higher upfront land costs. 
Another completion risk, transmission interconnection, 
may also be exacerbated under auctions, as wind 
resources are not as well dispersed as solar resources 
in India. Holding a nationwide wind auction would most 
likely lead to a concentration of wind farms in high wind 
zones. This may require building new transmission lines 
or increasing the capacity of existing network, which 
could lead to completion delays. 
In addition, technology risk, which in this context 
means high resource variability coupled with a lack of 
conclusive resource assessments for India can present 
a greater challenge to wind projects than solar projects 
(Phadke A. et al., 2011). 
Wind power auctions in other countries, as well as coal 
auctions in India, can demonstrate valuable lessons in 
risk management.
Wind power auctions in the U.K., Brazil, and South 
Africa, as well as coal-power auctions in India, have 
shown that flawed auction design and high completion 
risk can lead to a failure in deployment.
South Africa’s wind power auctions, similar to 
the U.K. and Brazil wind power auctions, did not 
include comprehensive policy support for building a 
transmission network to connect the expected new 
wind capacity, which prevented completed projects 
from connecting to the grid on time (Eberhard A., 2014). 
In India coal auctions, to mitigate the high completion 
risks associated with large power projects, India 
adopted Case-2 type bidding for coal Ultra Mega 
Power Projects (UMPP), where the government 
bears the risk of land acquisition and other regulatory 
permits (MoP, 2007). However, even with Case-2 type 
bidding, the first round of coal UMPP projects have 
yet to witness success in terms of deployment. Out of 
the four projects that were allotted, only one project, 
Mundra, has been able to commission all the units so 
far, albeit with a delay. The delays in commissioning the 
projects were largely due to developers seeking contract 
re-negotiation, due to a change in imported coal prices 
from Indonesia, and to a government delay in procuring 
land and permits (Business Line, 2011; Economic Times, 
2013). These problems could occur in potential wind 
power auctions as well.
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Wind auctions can be introduced in a controlled 
environment to address concerns over risks.
Given these concerns and evidence from other countries 
that wind auctions can lead to inadequate deployment, 
wind project developers have opposed attempts to 
introduce auctions for procurement of wind power in 
India. However, due to the possibility of a higher cost 
of support under feed-in tariff mechanism, auctions 
are worth considering, but they should be introduced 
cautiously and in a controlled environment. We suggest 
the following steps:
1. To counter underbidding, an auction-specific risk, 
strong penalties for not commissioning projects 
should be included, and perhaps bids could be 
completely underwritten by debt and equity 
investors as a prerequisite, as in the case of the 
South African wind and solar auctions (Table 4). 
2. For handling project risks such as delays in land 
acquisition, transmission interconnection, and 
resource assessment (technology risk), as a 
transition path, the government can bear the risk 
of land acquisition and other regulatory permits. 
Given the problems being faced in the execution 
of the coal UMPP projects, which were auctioned 
under a similar model, we suggest land acquisition 
and other regulatory permits be obtained before 
auctions are held.
3. The government could hold a location-specific 
auction once it identifies the land. Identifying the 
land prior to auctions would give adequate time 
for developers to undertake resource assessment 
studies. The government should also require 
that on-ground resource assessment studies by 
developers and certified production estimates by 
an independent evaluator be completed prior to 
bidding, as in the case of the Brazil Wind auctions 
(Table 3). 
4. To reduce the risk of variability in wind power 
production (another technology risk), 25 a design 
feature that allows squaring off excess production 
with shortfalls over four-year blocks would likely 
reduce the burden of penalties for variation in 
power production, as in the Brazil wind auctions 
(Table 3).
5. To reduce the risk of contract renegotiation owing 
to changes in fuel prices (for example, in the 
coal UMPP auctions), which is similar to what 
could happen for wind power due to poor wind 
resource assessment, prior identification of land 
and a prerequisite of resource assessment would 
likely help. This may be combined with other 
design features, such as contractual flexibility in 
carrying forward gains and losses in production and 
non-negotiable power purchase agreements (used 
in the South Africa wind and solar auctions). 
It is important to note that the above suggestions are 
meant to apply to interim auctions, which would act as 
a transition mechanism from the current feed-in tariff 
based procurement to an auctions-based procurement 
for wind power in India. Further research is required for 
designing full-fledged auctions for wind power.          
25 Due to high variability in wind power production, developers may not be 
comfortable to place bids for tariffs that would be applicable for long-term 
(20-25 years), given the expected high penalties for variations in power 
production and reduced profit margins under highly competitive auctions.    
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4. Conclusion
Auctions as a procurement mechanism for renewable 
energy have been cost-effective and fair in allocation 
in most cases, but so far have not resulted in adequate 
deployment, primarily due to poor risk management.
By analyzing the risks which can affect auctions, we 
found that changes to the design of auctions could 
enable them to adequately deploy renewable energy 
capacity, in a cost-effective and fair manner. We 
recommend the following changes which may help 
facilitate successful auctions:
 • To increase cost-effectiveness, which is affected 
most by auction design risk, ensure high 
competition by setting the volume of capacity 
auctioned well within the market’s ability to 
supply.
 • To improve deployment effectiveness, which is 
most affected by completion and financial risks:
 » Use support policies to improve transmission 
infrastructure.
 » Provide payment guarantees to reduce 
off-taker risk.
 » Use a pay-as-bid type of tariff determination 
instead of forcing selected bidders to match 
the lowest bid.
 • For further improvement of deployment 
effectiveness, which is also affected by 
underbidding risk, include stringent penalties for 
delays in commissioning of projects. 
 • For the specific case of wind energy in India, 
start with auctions in a controlled environment, 
in which the project site is identified, 
transmission infrastructure is planned, and 
resource assessment studies are completed 
prior to bidding.
Areas for future work include examining the 
effectiveness of risk mitigation design elements and 
how they could be improved; and the feasibility and 
design of full-fledged wind power auctions in India.
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6. Appendix
A. Types of auctions
Auctions are a method of procuring a service or a 
product, in which the government or any other procurer 
issues a call for tenders to purchase a pre-decided 
quantity of a services or goods. Electricity auctions are 
usually ‘reverse auctions’ meaning that the procurer 
typically states a benchmark price for the electricity to 
be procured and the bidders are asked to bid-down the 
price to be able to win the projects. The government 
selects the projects based on the price and/or other 
criteria and signs a power purchase agreement (PPA) 
for a specific period of time.
Reverse auction mechanism reverses the structure 
of a typical (forward) auction, where multiple buyers 
bid to buy something from a single seller to multiple 
sellers (project developers) bidding to sell something 
(in this case electricity) to a single buyer. Typically, 
reverse auctions are used to install a specific quantity of 
generating capacity unlike projects commissioned under 
feed-in tariff mechanism - another popular mechanism 
that is open-ended and designed to install as much 
capacity as possible that can be built economically at 
the specified price.26
While auctions have long been widely used for 
procurement of electricity by governments worldwide, 
the design of auctions continues to evolve depending on 
the governments’ objectives. Historically, governments 
were using uniform first-price auctions for electricity 
procurement until the introduction of discriminatory 
or pay-as-bid auctions in 2001 in England and Wales 
(Natalia, et al., 2002). Since then, governments have 
been experimenting with auction designs, leading to the 
introduction of different types of auctions. 
While there could be various ways to classify the types 
of auctions, we classify the auctions based on their price 
determination technique. The following are the main 
types of auctions and their characteristics:
Uniform price auctions
In a uniform price auction, all the successful bidders will 
receive payment at a single market-clearing price, which 
is the price at which supply equals demand. Some of 
the popular auction mechanisms such as sealed bid 
auctions and descending clock auctions use the uniform 
26 Governments are also experimenting with a limit on the capacity installa-
tion per year under feed-in tariff mechanism to avoid excessive capacity 
installation. Recently, the only major difference between the feed-in tariff 
mechanism and auctions has been the tariff determination method.
price method for allocating projects. While some of 
the auction mechanisms such as the descending clock 
auctions enable price discovery as part of their auction 
process, a few others such as the sealed-bid auctions 
do not allow price discovery. Regardless, in both auction 
types, the winners receive a uniform price.
Discriminatory price auctions 
In discriminatory price auctions, for example pay-as-bid 
and some hybrid auctions, the winners of the auction 
receive the price they bid, resulting in different prices. 
Discriminatory price auctions are typically used when 
there are multiple units of the same product to be 
allocated such as in electricity procurement.  
In the usual pay-as-bid sealed bid auctions, the 
auctioneer gathers all the bids to create a supply 
curve and then matches the bids with the quantity to 
be procured. All the bidders who have bid below the 
market-clearing price will be the winners of the auction. 
The winners will receive different prices according to the 
bids they submitted that fall below the clearing price.
Two-sided auction
In two-sided auctions, both supply and demand 
resources actively participate in an auction, allowing 
both bids and asks. A transaction will be created when 
the bid and ask prices match. In contrast, one-sided 
auctions such as the ones discussed above, only bids 
are allowed and the winner is usually the one who bids 
the highest or lowest, as in the case of reverse auctions. 
B. Research and data
We used both primary and secondary research 
techniques to collect data and information. For our 
primary research, we interviewed project developers, 
policymakers in India and other experts/researchers 
who studied energy auctions earlier. 
Our questionnaire (Appendix E) for policymakers and 
experts aims to gather information on the objectives 
of holding auctions, metrics to be used for measuring 
success/failure of auctions, and aspects of the design of 
auctions related to ceiling tariffs, ensuring competition, 
and the necessary qualification criteria to overcome the 
risks. 
Our questionnaire for project developers (Appendix E) 
was designed to understand the perspective of project 
developers on energy auctions vis-à-vis other prominent 
mechanisms such as the feed-in tariff. We posed 
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Table 4: Selection of auctions
AUCTION PROGRAM
SIMILAR 
COUNTRY 
AS INDIA
VARIATION – 
SUCCESS (S)/ 
FAILURE (F)* 
DATA 
AVAILABILITY
SELECTED FOR 
OVERALL FURTHER 
STUDY – 20 
AUCTIONS
SELECTED FOR COST-
EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS 
– 17 AUCTIONS
SELECTED FOR 
DEPLOYMENT 
EFFECTIVENESS 
ANALYSIS – 12 
AUCTIONS
India JNNSM Phase 1 
Batch 1 (Dec 2010) Yes Yes (S) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Karnataka Solar PV 
Phase 1 (Oct 2011) Yes Yes (S) Yes Yes Yes Yes
India JNNSM Phase 1 
Batch 2 (Dec 2011) Yes Yes (S) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tamil Nadu Solar PV 
Phase 1 (Dec 2012) Yes Yes (F) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Andhra Pradesh 
Solar PV (Feb 2013) Yes Yes (F) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Uttar Pradesh Solar 
PV (Mar 2013) Yes Yes (F) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bihar Solar PV (Jul 
2013) Yes Yes (F) No No No No
Karnataka Solar PV 
Phase 2 (Aug 2013) Yes Yes (S) Yes Yes Yes
No (Too early - com-
missioning data not 
available)
Madhya Pradesh 
Solar PV (Jan 2014) Yes Yes (S) Yes Yes Yes
No (Too early - com-
missioning data not 
available)
UK NFFO-1 (1990) No Yes (F) Yes Yes No (lack of comparable FIT) Yes
UK NFFO-2 (1991) No Yes (F) Yes Yes No (lack of comparable FIT) Yes
UK NFFO-3 (1994) No Yes (F) Yes Yes Yes Yes
UK NFFO-4 (1997) No Yes (F) Yes Yes Yes Yes
UK NFFO-4 (1998) No Yes (F) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Peru Wind (2009) Yes Yes (S) No No No No
Peru Solar PV 
(2009) Yes Yes (S) No No No No
Brazil Wind Phase 1 
(Dec 2009) Yes Yes (F) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Brazil Wind Phase 2 
(Aug 2010) Yes Yes (S) Yes Yes Yes
No (Data not 
available)
California RAM 1 & 
2 (Nov 2011 & Apr 
2012)
No Yes (S) Yes Yes No (lack of comparable FIT)
No (Too early - com-
missioning data not 
available)
Morocco Wind 
Phase 1 (2011) Yes Yes (S) No No No No
Morocco Solar 
(2012) Yes NA No No No No
S. Africa Wind Phase 
1 (2011) Yes Yes (F) Yes Yes Yes
No (Too early - com-
missioning data not 
available)
S. Africa Solar PV 
Phase 1 (2011) Yes Yes (F) Yes Yes Yes
No (Too early - com-
missioning data not 
available)
S. Africa Wind Phase 
2 (2012) Yes Yes (S) Yes Yes Yes
No (deadline for com-
missioning is around 
Apr 2015)
S. Africa Solar Phase 
2 (2012) Yes Yes (S) Yes Yes Yes
No (deadline for com-
missioning is around 
Apr 2015)
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questions to learn whether auctions provide correct 
investment signals for all sources of energy and for what 
reasons. In addition, we also enquired if there are any 
additional costs and risks for project developers under 
auctions compared to the feed-in tariff mechanism. 
We also undertook extensive secondary research 
of available literature, some of which we discuss in 
Appendix F.
Auctions sample
To measure the performance of auctions against 
the objectives of cost-effectiveness, deployment 
effectiveness, and market development, we selected a 
sample of renewable energy auctions to study in detail. 
Our primary sources for data on these auctions were 
government departments and agencies such as ANEEL 
(Brazilian Electricity Regulatory Agency), California 
Public Utilities Commission, National Renewable Energy 
Laboratory (U.S.), Osinergmin (Peru’s Energy and 
Mining Investment Supervisory Body), and Ministry of 
New and Renewable Energy (MNRE), India. In addition, 
we also sourced information from private groups, such 
as publications from International Finance Corporation 
(IFC), International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), 
World Bank, and individual researchers. 
Our criteria for selecting these auctions are: 
1. Auctions in similar large developing countries 
2. Auctions that provide variation in the sample – e.g., 
auctions in developed countries or auctions which 
were perceived to be failure or successful in popular 
literature
3. Data availability 
We applied these criteria to a larger group of auctions 
(Table 4) to select the most suitable auction programs 
to study in detail. 
C. Assumptions for competitive price 
calculation
We used our in-house LCOE models to estimate the 
competitive prices for auctions studied based on the 
following assumptions:
 • Most of the data points such as CUF (19%), 
useful life (25 years), working capital 
requirements (Payables: 45 days, Receivables: 
60 days), taxes, debt-equity ratio (70:30), and 
interest rate (in the range of 12.30-13.39%) were 
taken from CERC’s benchmark tariff orders 
applicable for that year.  
 • We have taken capital cost (which is in the 
range of INR 6.91-13.70 Cr./MW over the years) 
closer to the date of commissioning i.e., we 
considered one-year forward prices as solar PV 
projects typically take 12 months to be built. 
Developers also usually bid with one-year 
forward expected prices.  
 • CERC’s return on equity (ROE) appeared to be 
high at 22% when compared with our primary 
research findings. We have taken ROE (in 
the range of 16.99-17.25%) based on primary 
research and data from the PDD documents 
filed with the UNFCCC by the developers. 
D. Measurement of individual risks
Auction design risk: Includes risks related to the design 
of auctions, such as lack of competition, flawed tariff 
determination etc. This risk may overlap with the other 
two auction-specific risks: underbidding and collusion. 
However, auction design risk goes significantly 
beyond underbidding and has some uniqueness to be 
considered separately. We rated the intensity of auction 
design risk based on literature review and discussions 
with industry stakeholders.
Underbidding: This includes risks related to the risk of 
underbidding involved in an auction. For Indian auctions, 
for which we have bid-level data, we measured the 
presence of underbidding by examining the distance of 
the average bid from our estimated competitive tariff. If 
the average bid was lower in the range of INR 0-1/kWh, 
we rated it as 1, indicating less risk. Similarly, an average 
tariff lower in the range of INR 1-2/kWh was rated 2 and 
in the range of INR 2-3/kWh was rated 3. 
It is important to note that not every bid below the 
competitive tariff may have been an underbid. Bidders 
may have different cost structures or may have availed 
concessional finance, which allow them to bid lower 
than the normal market cost. 
Collusion:  We aimed to measure collusion among 
bidders by calculating standard deviation of bids from 
the average bid, with the assumption that higher the 
concentration of bids, the more likely it is that there 
was collusion among bidders.  If the standard deviation 
is in the range of 0-1, we ranked the risk intensity as 
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3 indicating high chances of collusion. A standard 
deviation in the range of 1-2 was ranked 2 and in the 
range of 2-3 was ranked 1 indicating low risk of collusion. 
Completion risk: Includes all factors that could delay 
the commissioning of the projects. For example, delays 
in land acquisition, environmental and regulatory 
permits, and transmission interconnection. We have 
rated the intensity based on literature review and 
discussions with industry stakeholders. 
Financial risk: Derives its value from several factors 
such as the bid placed, off-taker risk, developer credit-
worthiness, technology (wind or solar), or presence of 
any specific design element such as payment security 
mechanisms etc. As we don’t have information on 
all the factors that influence the financial closure, we 
primarily based financial risk intensity on bid placed 
(underbidding or not) and off-taker risk. However, the 
value assigned to financial risk is a synthesis of different 
risks that goes significantly beyond the summation of 
underbidding and off-taker risk. 
Off-taker risk: Off-taker risk is especially applicable in 
the case of Indian state auctions where the procurers 
are state distribution utilities, the majority of which 
suffer from poor financial health. To measure this risk, 
we used the state utilities rankings by India’s credit 
rating agencies.27 Auctions for which the procurer was 
rated A+ and A, we have given a risk intensity of 1 
indicating low off-taker risk. Similarly, for B+ we have 
given 2 and B, C+, and C we have given 3, indicating high 
off-taker risk. 
Technology risk: For renewable energy auctions, 
technology risk is predominantly the risk of reliability of 
resource assessment studies. This risk is somewhat high 
for Indian auctions compared with auctions in other 
countries due to lack of accurate on-ground resource 
assessment data.
E. Questionnaires
Questionnaire for policymakers and experts
OBJECTIVES OF AUCTIONS
1. What are the objectives of holding (reverse) auctions?
a) Price reduction/discovery?
b) (Timely) capacity deployment?
c) Meeting budget caps?
d) Fairness in allocation?
e) Others?
27 Ratings by Investment information and Credit Rating Agency (ICRA), 
Credit Rating Information Service of India Limited (CRISIL), and Credit 
Analysis and Research (CARE).
MEASURING SUCCESS/FAILURE OF AUCTIONS
2. How do you define success with respect to (reverse) auctions 
mechanism?
a) Price reduction from benchmark price? 
•  How would you pick the benchmark price, and why?
• How much price reduction will be considered a success, and 
why?
b) Capacity deployed as a % of total capacity auctioned?
• Commissioned capacity?  
• Capacity online after X years? 
• What would be the thresholds (% capacity, X, etc.), and why?
c) Others?
3. How do we measure drawbacks of (reverse) auctions?
a) Underbidding/ winner’s curse that could lead to deployment failure 
b) Collusion among bidders to prevent price reduction 
c) Inequity in terms of a lot of capacity going to a few developers?
d) Others? 
4. Are project delays magnified under (reverse) auctions com-
pared with FIT mechanisms? Why? 
5. How do we separate the non-auction factors from (reverse) 
auction design in determining the success or failure of auctions?
a) Price reduction: auctions vs. 
• Reduction in capital expenditure (e.g., panel prices)
• Reduction due to provision of concessional finance
• Others?
b) Capacity deployment: auctions vs. failure to deploy expected 
capacity due to
• Transmission constraints
• Delays in resource assessment/procurement 
• Delays in land acquisition
• Delays in getting permits
c) Others?
6. Auctions introduce a large chunk of power generation capacity 
into the system around the same time unlike the FIT mechanism. 
a) Is the bottleneck in transmission capacity a common problem for 
large energy capacity auctions?
b) Do auctions cause transmission constraints or the systemic problem 
of lack of transmission that creates problems for auctions?
DESIGN OF AUCTIONS
7. There are several types of (reverse) auction mechanisms. 
Which auction would you use, and why?
a) Single round – e.g., sealed bid
• Sealed-bid, lowest-price (also known as L1): the N winners are 
paid the lowest bid
• Sealed-bid, pay-as-you-bid (as used in JNNSM): the N winners 
are paid what they bid
b) Multiple rounds – e.g., descending clock auction (for price discovery): 
the N winners are paid the market-clearing price
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c) Hybrid auctions – combination of the above two
d) Others?
8. What factors come into play when deciding the timelines for 
projects in auctions, and why?
a) Capacity deployment target deadlines? 
b) Based on existing projects’ construction timeline? 
c) Based on technology maturity?
d) Based on availability of supporting infrastructure, such as 
transmission lines, resources – land and water (e.g., for CSP)? 
e) Others?
9. Is setting the ceiling price for reverse auctions necessary? 
Why?
a) Does this provide an indication – similar to multiple round auctions – 
of where the market could be?
b) Wouldn’t bidders gather around the ceiling price, and defeat the 
rationale – i.e., price reduction – behind reverse auction?
c) Others?
10.  How can policymakers ensure high level of participation in 
(reverse) auctions?
a) Reasonably high ceiling price? 
b) Limiting the capacity auctioned?
c) Less stringent pre-qualification/penalty criteria?
d) Others?
11.  What design elements should reverse auctions have to reduce 
the chances of underbidding, leading to deployment issues? 
a) Technical pre-qualification to ensure non-serious bidders do not 
enter?
b) Bid bond?
c) Project completion bond?
d) Penalties for poor performance of the project?
e) Others? 
12. How do policymakers strike a balance between having robust 
qualification criteria and ensuring high competition? 
13. Beyond penalties, how can auctions ensure that capacity is 
deployed on time? (What should the government do vs. what 
should the developers do?)
a) Ensuring that transmission interconnection would not be a problem
b) Ensuring that land acquisition is not a problem
c) Ensuring that resource assessment is not a problem
d) Others?
14. What are some of the ways that can be adopted to limit the 
chances of collusion among bidders in auctions?
a) Single round sealed bid auctions?
b) Holding auctions infrequently?
c) Increasing competition?
d) Others?
15. 
16. How can fairness in allocation of projects be guaranteed in 
auctions?
a) Capping the number of projects or volumes that can be bid by a 
particular bidder?
b) Adopting an auction design that does not favor any particular type of 
players such as – foreign, state-owned, or private players?
c) Others?
Questionnaire for project developers
[NOTE: Please compare with FIT where appropriate]
1. Do auctions provide the correct investment signals? 
a) For conventional power? 
b) For all renewable technologies? 
c) For specific renewable technology?
d) Others (please specify)?
2. If yes, why?
a) Clear and predictable capacity targets?
b) Market prices ensuring no retroactive price cuts?
c) Fairness in allocation?
d) Transparency in allocation?
e) Others (please specify)?
3. If not, why?
a) Using auctions for new technologies that have uncertain technology 
costs?
b) Allowing non-serious/non-capable players that could engage in price 
war?
c) High competition leading to lower margins?
d) Low benchmark prices?
e) High time pressure due to discrete and chunky occurrence?
f) Lack of supporting policies, such as permitting and grid 
interconnection? 
g) Lack of supporting resources, such as land and water?
h) Lack of supporting infrastructure such as transmission capacity?
i) Others (please specify)?
4. Do you incur additional transaction costs in auctions com-
pared with projects allocated under FIT mechanism? 
a) If yes, what are they?
• Dealing with pre-qualification criteria?
• Dealing with bid-bonds?
• Dealing with performance-bonds?
• Legal fee (other than above)?
• Advisory fee (other than above – e.g., for bidding strategies)?
• Others (please specify)?
b) Do these additional costs really matter? Why and how?
5. Is cost of financing (i.e., equity or debt) higher under 
auctions? Why?
6. What are main risks of using auctions for energy 
procurement? Why? 
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a) Underbidding leading to low returns and eventual non-deployment?
b) Aggressive timelines leading to higher construction/commissioning 
risk?
• Procurement of resources a-priori – e.g., land, water, etc. – 
leading to stranded assets in case of losing?
• Accurate resource assessment (e.g., for wind or solar), which 
may go to waste in case of losing?
• Inability to get transmission interconnection?
• Others (please specify)?
c) Others (please specify)?
7. In what way each of the risks identified above can be handled 
better?
a) Stringent qualification criteria – technical and financial -- to avoid 
underbidding?  What should it be?
b) Prior acquisition of land? 
• Is it possible to acquire options to buy land?
• Does maintaining land banks help?
• Should the government help – why and how?
c) Undertaking resource assessment studies before bidding?  Should the 
government help – why and how?
d) Ensuring feasibility of transmission interconnection? Should the 
government help – why and how?
e) Others?
8. It appears that there is a general perception in India that 
auctions/ competitive bidding for wind power wouldn’t work. 
(However, the solar auctions seem to have worked.)
a) Do you agree? 
• If yes, what are the reasons?
• If no, what are the reasons?
b) Are there technology-specific risks for auctions? What are they?
9. Would you prefer auction designs that allow price discovery 
over those that wouldn’t? (For e.g., multiple round descending 
clock auctions over single round sealed-bid auctions?)
a) Why would you prefer one to the other?
b) In what circumstances your preferences would change?
F. Prior work
Previously a number of individual researchers and 
organizations have studied the use of auctions for 
renewable energy procurement globally. Some of 
these studies had a similar agenda of examining 
whether auctions have resulted in achieving the stated 
policy objectives. We discuss a few of these studies, 
their approach, and findings in this section. A full 
list of literature that we reviewed is presented in the 
References section. 
In Kreycik C., Couture T., and Cory K. (2011), the authors 
evaluate procurement strategies such as feed-in tariffs 
and auctions on four criteria – pricing, complexity 
and efficiency of the process, impacts on developers’ 
access to markets, and ability to compliment utility 
decision-making processes. These criteria were chosen 
to take into account the perspective of each group of 
stakeholders viz., end-use power consumers, regulators, 
distribution companies, investors, and developers. 
The paper identifies the advantages and disadvantages 
of the different procurement mechanisms and advises 
governments to make an informed choice given the 
policy objectives. 
Maurer L. and Barroso L., 2011 discusses efficient 
practices in electricity auctions in general and 
renewable auctions specifically. The report focuses 
on the lessons learned and experiences from both 
developed and developing countries. Countries/regions 
examined include: Brazil, Chile, Peru, Mexico, Vietnam, 
Philippines, Europe, and North America. The authors 
conclude that, if auctions are successfully designed and 
implemented, they may lead to far superior results than 
other procurement mechanisms.
Becker B. and Fischer D., 2012 compares the FIT 
mechanism with Auctions for renewable energy 
procurement with the experience in three emerging 
countries viz., China, India, and South Africa. The paper 
highlights the importance of policy objectives on policy 
choice and design. The authors conclude that India and 
South Africa could achieve their capacity targets in a 
cost-effective manner using auctions.  
Cozzi P., 2012: The author assesses the success and 
failure of reverse auctions for renewable energy with 
case studies on U.K., China, and Brazil. The author 
identifies “success” and “failure” so far as possible with 
regards to the goals of those implementing the policy.
Conti M., 2012: The paper outlines how reverse auctions 
work in practice and arrives at conclusions based on 
outcomes from three case studies: California, Brazil, and 
Texas.
IRENA, 2013 analyses the design of renewable energy 
auctions in selected developing countries viz., Brazil, 
China, Morocco, Peru, and South Africa. The authors 
qualitatively determine the success and failure of 
auctions in these countries. The authors also discuss 
the role of design elements such as the type of 
auction, ceiling prices, auction volumes, administrative 
procedures, and guarantees and penalties in 
determining the success or failure of auctions.  
